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In recent times, the discourse surrounding UFOs has undergone a notable shift away from outright dismissal. NASA has shown increased interest in the phenomenon, and even the New York Times engages with the topic. However, the assertion that we’re currently experiencing extraterrestrial visitation remains largely met with skepticism; observers often dismiss it as delusional. The notion that UFOs might represent encounters with extraterrestrial life or other extraordinary entities continues to elicit astonishment among the general public. This article aims to challenge this prevailing sense of astonishment.

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Historically, UFO sightings and even more outlandish claims of extraterrestrial contact, such as abductions, have been relegated to modern mythology. While this dismissal can’t be entirely disregarded—the Roswell incident, for instance, may be a prime example—it shouldn’t necessarily be applied universally. If the thousands of reported sightings are nothing more than misidentifications or natural phenomena, a single verified instance of extraterrestrial contact would be paradigm-shifting. Yet, despite any media coverage of UFOs, the underlying prejudice against the possibility of genuine extraterrestrial visitation remains deeply entrenched. This is evidenced by the lack of significant national or international discourse on the existence of extraterrestrial visits following any reported sighting, within mainstream media, major international bodies (such as the United Nations), and among political leaders. At best, the prevailing response is one of resignation, with calls for further observation. The idea that we’re currently being visited by extraterrestrials is generally considered ludicrous, whether explicitly or implicitly, something truly extraordinary, and beyond serious consideration. Consequently, questioning the existence of extraterrestrial life, whether in the Earth’s atmosphere or on its surface, remains largely taboo.

Our initial astonishment at the prospect of extraterrestrial visitation warrants closer scrutiny. Prevailing explanations for UFO sightings have often relied on psychological or sociological factors, such as mass hysteria or collective hallucinations. These explanations frame the phenomenon as primarily a social or psychological construct, dismissing the possibility of genuine extraterrestrial encounters. However, one can reverse these rationalizing interpretations by considering that the critical judgments themselves are subject to scrutiny and could be biased. These dubious interpretations may amplify existing societal biases, influencing how we consider UFO sightings. They don’t, however, account for the taboo surrounding the possibility of extraterrestrial visits nor our astonishment if we witness them. On the contrary, by deeming explanations involving extraterrestrial visits irrational, these interpretations may reinforce and even justify this taboo. If it’s irrational to believe in UFOs, then those who do so only have to remain silent; those who think they’ve seen a UFO would have reasons not to believe their eyes, since they’ve been told such sightings are but a fantasy.

Some have already denounced this taboo, including William C. Lane, a lawyer and philosopher, who has recently argued for open inquiry into unexplained UFO phenomena. But one might also ask: what’s behind such a bias?

It may be that the cause is a deeply ingrained anthropocentric worldview, a perspective that places humanity at the center of the universe. This bias is evident, for example, in our historical treatment of animal consciousness. For centuries, the prevailing view asserted human cognitive exceptionalism. Any claim of animal consciousness and intelligence was met with disbelief and even resistance, highlighting this ingrained anthropocentric bias. Similarly, the concept of extraterrestrial life has long challenged human exceptionalism. It’s worth recalling that Giordano Bruno, who maintained that the universe was infinite and populated by other worlds similar to ours, was burned at the stake. It isn’t that an anthropocentric belief, even a religious one, necessarily implies denying animal consciousness or extraterrestrial life.

Take Kant, for example: a devout Christian who championed humanity’s special place in nature, he nonetheless entertained the notion of other worlds populated by rational beings; this, too, didn’t stop him from refuting Descartes’s view of animals as mere machines. However, this is an exception, and as proof, the idea of a universe teeming with life, as supported by scientific evidence and programs like SETI (the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence), which uses radio telescopes to listen for signals from other civilizations, represent a significant shift from the earlier view that Earth was the sole cradle of life. This historical perspective underscores how deeply ingrained anthropocentrism has shaped our understanding of our place in the cosmos. It’s likely that this deeply rooted bias continues to influence our perception of the UFO phenomenon.

Were we not burdened by anthropocentrism, the possibility of extraterrestrial visitation might seem far less extraordinary. We’d likely be more receptive to empirical data and devote greater attention to the phenomenon, treating it as a legitimate subject of inquiry rather than relegating it to the realm of flying saucer folklore. This persistent dismissal is sometimes understood as a form of “ufophobia”—an aversion to the idea that UFOs are real extraterrestrial intelligences. This aversion bears a striking resemblance to the historical resistance encountered by researchers studying animal consciousness. The influential ethologist Donald R. Griffin coined the term “mentophobia” to describe the fear of acknowledging animal minds, a fear that could ostracize researchers and jeopardize their careers.

This discussion focuses on the possibility of extraterrestrial visitation, acknowledging that such visits may never have occurred. However, between those who readily accept such visits based on empirical data—often involving spectacular and unexplained events attested to by witnesses, in particular those presumed credible due to their position and training (such as military or police personnel)—and those who categorically deny the possibility, the latter group’s arguments often lack weight. Common objections, such as the vast distances involved in interstellar travel, rely on assumptions about extraterrestrial technology limited by our own current understanding. Again, this isn’t to assert that extraterrestrial visitation has occurred, but rather to question the dismissal of compelling evidence based on such limited assumptions. The Fermi Paradox, which posits that the absence of observable extraterrestrial civilizations is paradoxical given the vastness and age of the universe and the potential for other intelligent life, exemplifies this tendency to overlook the possibility of contact. Discussions of the Fermi Paradox often fail to consider the possibility that we may have, in fact, already encountered evidence of extraterrestrial intelligent life.

Consider the seemingly paradoxical stance of research scientist Robert A. Freitas Jr. as demonstrated in two well-known articles (both available on the French version of Wikipedia). In “Extraterrestrial Intelligence in the Solar System: Resolving the Fermi Paradox,” published in 1983 in the Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Freitas acknowledges the ongoing reports of UFOs; however, he dismisses them, writing that “it is conceded that continuing reports of UFOs in our skies, however controversial, cannot be taken as convincing evidence of extraterrestrial visitation or technology.” Even if this evidence is inconclusive, it could have been used to show that the Fermi Paradox is at least weakened. Instead of dismissing UFO sightings outright as Freitas does, excluding them from the debate altogether, they could’ve been considered seriously.

In his subsequent 1984 study “Fermi’s Paradox: A Real Howler,” published in Isaac Asimov’s Science Fiction Magazine, Freitas argues for the existence of extraterrestrial civilizations, contending that the Fermi Paradox is flawed due to anthropocentric assumptions and limited data. Our inability to detect extraterrestrial intelligence, he argues, doesn’t negate their existence but rather reflects the constraints of our current knowledge and technology. He even entertains explanations for the absence of definitive contact, such as the possibility of extraterrestrials deliberately avoiding us or quarantining our civilization. The contrasting views expressed by Freitas in these two articles are illustrative of a broader contemporary viewpoint that may seem contradictory. On the one hand, we entertain the possibility of extraterrestrial civilizations, as evidenced by scientific endeavors like SETI. On the other hand, having acknowledged this possibility, we nonetheless dismiss UFO sightings as credible evidence of extraterrestrial visitation.

Some might argue that there’s no anthropocentric bias and therefore no paradox. If we don’t believe that UFOs are evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence, it’s either because we have good reasons for it or because we have bad reasons—but not reasons that are anthropocentric, perhaps influential in the past but no longer a factor. After all, our exploration of deep space, driven partly by the search for extraterrestrial civilizations, suggests that there has finally been recognition of our place within a larger cosmic population context. However, this apparent contradiction could arise not from a lack of anthropocentrism, but rather from a complex interplay of factors. The historical denial of animal consciousness provides a relevant parallel.

Many philosophers, including the Stoics followed by Descartes and Malebranche, and even until very recently with Donald Davidson and Peter Carruthers, have rejected the mind of animals, denying at best their capacity for thought, at worst any consciousness at all. This denial, however, wasn’t universally accepted. Thinkers such as Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Porphyry, Montaigne, Gassendi, Voltaire, Hume, and Condillac, among others, argued against it. This recognition has now gained widespread acceptance, as evidenced by the significant place taken by cognitive ethology, which Griffin founded against behaviorism by insisting that the consciousness of animals be included in their study and the mirrored proliferation in the media of reports on the cognitive faculties of animals.

Thus, while anthropocentrism may have hindered progress, it didn’t entirely prevent the eventual recognition of animal consciousness. Similarly, while anthropocentrism may contribute to the current skepticism surrounding UFOs, it doesn’t preclude the possibility of acknowledging extraterrestrial life. Just as anthropocentrism once dismissed animal consciousness, while research to prove it continued, it may have also fostered a contemporary taboo around UFOs, without hindering the search for signs of extraterrestrial civilizations.

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However, other reasons, besides anthropocentrism, could explain our skepticism about UFOs. This denial could be motivated by the fear of admitting the presence of beings more advanced and therefore more powerful than us. It could even be argued here that, instead of anthropocentrism, we should actually be talking about anthropomorphism, since we ascribe hostile intentions to aliens as we tend to do to anyone or anything unlike ourselves. But we shouldn’t dismiss this hypothesis on the grounds of anthropomorphism any more than we were justified in rejecting the possibility of animal consciousness in the past for the same reason. From this perspective, we can observe that Stephen Hawking, who warned against the risk of bellicose extraterrestrials while also acknowledging animal consciousness (as a signatory of the 2012 Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness), was remarkably consistent. Above all, far from excluding the hypothesis of persistent anthropocentrism, such fear—whether anthropomorphic or not—can actually be seen as evidence for it: the comforting belief that beings stronger than us don’t exist is a logical consequence of our fear.

It could also be argued that some claims related to UFOs have been proven fake. Examples include the well-known Roswell alien autopsy hoax and the debunked phenomenon of crop circles. In other cases, like that of the “best UFO photo ever seen,” who’s to say it’s not also a trick or an optical illusion, as skeptics claim? That said, just as the scientific study of animal consciousness didn’t grind to a halt due to exaggerated claims about animal intelligence, the presence of hoaxes should not necessarily preclude a serious examination of UFO sightings. Here too, the historical parallel with animal cognition is instructive.

The case of “Clever Hans,” a horse from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who supposedly possessed mathematical abilities (later attributed to unconscious cues from his trainer), didn’t definitively disprove animal intelligence. At best, the discredit caused by this type of case only amplifies a disbelief that was present at the outset and is reactivated or reinforced on this occasion. If you believe something is probable or even just possible, a few instances of deception won’t easily sway your opinion, unless there are other factors that go deeply against your initial belief. This is not a trivial statement, as the phenomenon of belief perseverance, all the more striking when it’s no longer justified, has been studied for a long time. It’s even possible that anthropocentrism is no longer the primary driver of UFO skepticism. However, even if this bias has waned, it may have established a foundation of disbelief, some routine of denial or mental rut, that persists due to other factors, such as the aforementioned hoaxes or the fear of aliens.

Regardless of the root cause, the social stigma associated with UFO sightings remains significant and could have a chilling effect on individuals who believe in the possibility of extraterrestrial contact, potentially influencing their willingness to publicly acknowledge or discuss such possibility. This social pressure might even be present in academic discourse through the reluctance to use the UFO phenomenon as evidence against the Fermi Paradox. Only when the discussion of UFOs transitions from a sensational topic for late-night entertainers to a legitimate subject of academic and public discourse can we truly consider the taboo broken and begin to seriously explore the implications of potential extraterrestrial contact. Until then, we remain constrained by subtle forms of social censorship. This self-censorship may stem from deeply ingrained biases, including the lingering effects of anthropocentrism, and it may prevent us from fully recognizing one of the most important discoveries in human history. We might be right to disbelieve—provided we disbelieve for good reasons.


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